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Abstract
We provide the first estimate of the impacts of automation on individual workers by com-
bining Dutch micro-data with a direct measure of automation expenditures covering firms
in all private non-financial industries over 2000-2016. Using an event study differences-in-
differences design, we find that automation at the firm increases the probability of workers
separating from their employers and decreases days worked, leading to a 5-year cumulative
wage income loss of about 8% of one year’s earnings for incumbent workers. We find little
change in wage rates. Further, lost wage earnings are only partially offset by various benefits
systems and are disproportionately borne by older workers and workers with longer firm
tenure. Compared to findings from a literature on mass layoffs, the effects of automation are
more gradual and automation displaces far fewer workers, both at the individual firms and
in the workforce overall.
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1 Introduction
Advancing technologies are increasingly able to fully or partially automate a broad range of job
tasks, even ones that had previously been considered non-routine, such as interpreting X-rays
to diagnose disease, selecting job applicants for interviewing, picking orders in a warehouse, or
driving a car. These technologies range from robotics to speech recognition and other appli-
cations of artificial intelligence, and are being applied across a broad range of sectors of the
economy. Some commentators warn that the pace of automation may be accelerating and the
range of jobs affected is widening, threatening displacement across large shares of jobs in the
near future (Frey and Osborne 2016; Ford 2015). A large literature on worker displacement1
suggests that the effects of such developments could indeed be dire: individual workers subject
to plant closings and mass layoffs experience reduced employment probabilities and wage scar-
ring, leading to long-term earnings losses, as well as reductions in consumption and worse health
outcomes. These discussions have led to a call for new policies to support workers displaced by
automation, such as a universal basic income.
The potential for automation to displace workers is being taken seriously in recent labor
market models where technology changes the comparative advantage of workers across job tasks
(Autor et al. 2003; Acemoglu and Autor 2011; Acemoglu and Restrepo 2018a,d,b; Benzell et al.
2016; Susskind 2017). In these theories, worker displacement is a possible outcome of automation
as machines take over tasks previously performed by humans. Automation can also lead to
worker displacement if the new technologies require workers with different skills than those of
the incumbent workforce.
However, direct empirical evidence on the worker-level impacts of automation is lacking:
this paper provides the first estimate of the economic impacts on workers when their firm
invests in automation technology. We link an annual firm survey on automation costs to Dutch
administrative firm and worker databases, allowing us to consider automation across all private
non-financial economic sectors. The data are provided by Statistics Netherlands and cover years
2000-2016: we observe 36,085 firms with at least three years of automation cost data, employing
close to 5 million unique workers per year on average.
This paper makes several contributions. Firstly, we directly measure automation at the firm
level and can therefore study the worker impacts of automation where they originate: at the
1Starting with Ruhm (1991) and Jacobson et al. (1993).
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automating firms. Secondly, we develop and implement an empirical methodology combining
event study with difference-in-differences analysis, leveraging the timing of firm-level automation
events for identifying causal effects. Thirdly, we consider automation events as they occur across
all private non-financial sectors of the economy rather than considering a specific automation
technology in isolation. Fourthly, we measure a rich array of outcomes for individual workers
for the years surrounding the automation event. These outcomes include wage earnings, daily
wages, firm separation, days spent in non-employment, self-employment, early retirement, and
unemployment insurance and welfare receipts. We also look separately at outcomes for incum-
bent workers employed three or more years at the firm prior to the automation event, and for the
firm’s more recent hires, and consider how impacts differ across worker characteristics. Lastly,
we compare the impacts of displacement from automation to those arising from mass lay-offs and
firm closures, both within firms and, using a back-of-the-envelope calculation, in the economy
as a whole.
We find that automation at the firm increases the probability of workers separating from
their employers. For incumbent workers (those with at least three years of firm tenure), this
firm separation is followed by a decrease in annual days worked, leading to a 5-year cumulative
wage income loss of about 8% of one year’s earnings. Wage rates, however, are not much
affected. Further, wage income losses are disproportionately borne by older workers and are
only partially offset by various benefits systems. Compared to findings from a literature on
mass layoffs, however, the effects of automation are more gradual and automation displaces far
fewer workers, both at the individual firms and in the workforce overall.
While the related economic literature on technological change is large, little of it specifically
addresses questions about automation. Indeed, empirical work on automation has so far mostly
focused on robotics – a prime example of an automation technology, albeit one that has pene-
trated only a limited number of sectors– and on aggregate outcomes.2 The evidence is mixed:
Graetz and Michaels (2018) find that industrial robots have had positive wage effects and no
employment effects across a panel of countries and industries, whereas Acemoglu and Restrepo
(2018c) find that wages and employment have decreased in US regions most exposed to automa-
tion by robots. Applying Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018c)’s empirical design to German regions,
Dauth et al. (2017) find evidence of positive wage effects, and no changes in total employment.
2Other papers have looked at cross-sectional features of automation in manufacturing including Doms et al.
(1997) and Dinlersoz and Wolf (2018).
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A broader empirical literature indeed makes clear that large-scale automation need not bring
about labor displacement in aggregate, but rather, leads to labor reallocation. For one, even
within the affected industry, automation can increase employment if industry demand is suffi-
ciently elastic (Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018a,d); Bessen (2018)). Moreover, there is evidence
that productivity gains generate employment increases in other industries through input-output
linkages as well as final demand effects, offsetting any employment losses in automating indus-
tries (Autor and Salomons (2018); Gregory et al. (2018)). It should be noted that our analyses
do not consider these countervailing forces: this implies our findings do not inform on the macro-
economic impacts of automation. However, to understand how automation affects work, it is
critical to also study its effects on individual workers. After all, the absence of displacement in
aggregate need not imply the absence of losses for individual workers directly affected by au-
tomation. These micro-level impacts are also of first-order importance for policymakers aiming
to assuage adverse impacts out of distributional concerns.
This paper is structured as follows. We first introduce our data source, Dutch matched
employer-employee data which we link to a firm survey containing a direct measure of au-
tomation expenditures. Section 3 contains our empirical approach, outlining a definition of
automation events and the resulting estimation framework using a combination of event study
and differences-in-differences. Our results are divided into total impacts on workers’ wage in-
come (section 4), which we decompose into firm separation and employment impacts (section
5), and daily wage impacts conditional on employment (section 6). We next consider to what
extent wage income losses are compensated by various benefit schemes (section 7), and how these
losses differ across worker types (section 8). Lastly, in section 9 we consider the worker costs of
automation conditional on displacement and compare these to income losses arising from mass
lay-offs and firm closures in section 10. The final section concludes.
2 Data
We use Dutch data provided by Statistics Netherlands. In particular, we link an annual firm
survey to administrative firm and worker databases covering the universe of firms and workers
in the Netherlands. The firm survey is called ‘Production statistics’ (“Productiestatistieken”)
and includes a direct question on automation costs– it covers all non-financial private firms with
4
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more than 50 employees, and samples a subset of smaller non-financial private firms.3 This
survey can be matched to administrative company (“Algemeen Bedrijfsregister”) and worker
records (“GBA” and “BAAN” files).
Our data cover years 2000-2016, and we retain 36,085 unique firms with at least 3 years
of automation cost data – together, these firms employ 4,962,682 unique workers annually on
average. We remove firms where Statistics Netherlands indicate that the data are (partly)
imputed. We further remove workers enrolled in full-time studies earning either less than 5,000
euros per year or less than 10 euros per day, as well as workers earning more than half a million
euros per year or more than 2,000 euros on average per day.4 For workers observed in multiple
jobs simultaneously, we only retain the one providing the main source of income in each year.
We use their total earnings in all jobs as the main measure of wage income.
At the worker level, we observe gross wage income as well as days worked – since we do
not observe hours worked, we use daily wages as a measure of wage rates. We further observe
workers’ gender, age, and nationality5. A downside of these data is that we do not observe
workers’ occupations nor their education level: the former is unavailable entirely, whereas the
latter is only defined for a small and selected subset of workers (with availability skewed towards
the high-educated). We further match worker-level data to administrative records on receipts
from unemployment, welfare, disability, and retirement benefits. We can track workers across
firms on a daily basis, allowing us to construct indicators for firm separation and days spent in
non-employment.
The main advantage of the dataset we construct is the availability of a direct measure of
automation at the firm level. In particular, “Automation costs” is an official bookkeeping term
defined as costs of third-party automation services. This also includes non-activated purchases
of custom software and costs of new software releases, but excludes prepackaged software licens-
ing costs. These automation costs are not restricted to manufacturing firms and could include
expenditures related to automation technologies such as self-service check-outs, warehouse and
storage systems, or automated customer service. Another example are robotics integrator ser-
vices highlighted (and used as an instrument for robotic technology adoption) in Acemoglu and
3Firms are legally obliged to respond to the survey when sampled. However, the sampling design implies our
data underrepresent smaller firms: we will examine effect heterogeneity across firm size classes to consider how
this sample selection affects our overall findings.
4In Appendix A.3 we perform robustness checks from several other sample restrictions, including removing
firms with outlier employment changes and those undergoing events such as mergers and acquisitions.
5In these data, individuals are classified as “Dutch” if they themselves and both of their parents have been
born in the Netherlands.
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Table 1: Automation cost share distribution
All observations Automation costs >0
Cost level Cost share Cost level Cost share
p5 0 0.00% 2,026 0.03%
p10 0 0.00% 3,663 0.06%
p25 0 0.00% 9,775 0.14%
median 10,988 0.15% 27,912 0.31%
p75 49,446 0.47% 87,115 0.67%
p90 179,641 1.05% 283,703 1.36%
p95 422,000 1.69% 658,695 2.11%
mean 196,351 0.45% 284,692 0.65%
% of N with 0 costs 31.03% 31.03% 0.00% 0.00%
N firms × years 241,292 241,292 166,418 166,418
Notes: Automation cost level in 2010 euros, automation cost share as a
percentage of total costs, excluding automation costs. The number of obser-
vations is the number of firms times the number of years.
Restrepo (2018d). While the downside of this measure is that we do not know the exact au-
tomation technology being used by the firm, it does capture all such technologies rather than
focusing on a single one, and we measure it at the level of the firm rather than industry.
Table 1 shows summary statistics on annual automation costs for firms, both in levels and as
a percentage of total costs (excluding automation costs). This highlights several things. Firstly,
we observe zero automation expenditures for almost one-third of firm-year observations. Further,
the average automation cost share is 0.45 percent, corresponding to an outlay of around 200,000
euros annually, but this distribution is highly right-skewed as the median is only 0.15 percent –
this is true even when removing observations with zero automation costs.
Table 2 further shows how these automation costs and cost shares differ by broad sector. Our
comprehensive measure of automation technologies indicates that all sectors have automation
expenditures, though there is substantial variation at the firm level within each of these broad
sectors. The highest mean automation cost share is observed in Professional, scientific, and
technical activities, followed by Information and communication (which also has the highest
level), and Administrative and support activities; conversely, Construction has the lowest share
of automation expenditures in total costs. Most variance in automation cost expenditures can
be observed in wholesale and retail trade: this may of course be because this broad sector
covers firms engaged in very different activities which require different automation technologies.
While we do not use either this sectoral or between-firm variation in our empirical identification
strategy, we will consider effect heterogeneity across sectors since the nature of automation
6
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Table 2: Automation costs by sector
Cost level Cost share Nr of observations
Sector Mean Mean Std dev Firms Firms × yrs
Manufacturing 395,310 0.36% 0.63% 5,605 45,308
Construction 72,400 0.20% 0.36% 4,529 28,927
Wholesale and retail trade 107,600 0.33% 7.51% 11,086 76,283
Transportation and storage 255,270 0.40% 0.98% 3,194 21,779
Accommodation and food serving 53,550 0.30% 0.49% 1,176 6,355
Information and communication 427,080 0.87% 3.10% 2,651 16,804
Professional, scientific, and technical activities 142,720 1.05% 1.80% 3,940 22,826
Administrative and support activities 123,030 0.50% 1.24% 3,904 23,010
Notes: Automation cost level in 2010 euros, automation cost shares as a percentage of total costs, excluding
automation costs. Total N firms is 36,085; Total N firms × years is 241,292.
Table 3: Automation costs by firm size class
Cost level Cost share Nr of observations
Firm size class Mean Mean Std dev Firms Firms × yrs
0-9 employees 22,670 0.35% 1.05% 9,241 48,869
10-19 employees 24,890 0.47% 9.34% 8,036 49,112
20-49 employees 48,750 0.44% 1.61% 9,771 68,872
50-99 employees 105,130 0.44% 1.04% 4,464 34,758
100-199 employees 265,650 0.49% 1.14% 2,344 19,825
200-499 employees 712,990 0.59% 1.37% 1,446 12,620
≥500 employees 3,285,220 0.70% 1.78% 783 7,236
Notes: Automation costs as a percentage of total costs, excluding automation
costs. Total N firms is 36,085; Total N firms × years is 241,292.
technologies may be sector-specific.
Table 3 reports the same statistics but separately by firm size class, grouped into 7 classes
used by Statistics Netherlands: the smallest firms have fewer than 10 employees whereas the
largest have more than 500. Unsurprisingly, automation cost levels rise with firm size: firms with
fewer than 20 employees spend around 25,000 euros annually on automation services, whereas the
largest firms spend close to 3.3 million. Less obviously, this table also reveals that automation
cost shares increase with firm size: the very smallest firms have average automation cost shares
of 0.35%, whereas firms with between 10 to 200 employees have a cost share of around 0.48%.
This increases to 0.59% for firms between 200 and 500 workers, and 0.70% for firms with more
than 500 workers. Again, however, there is substantial variation within these size classes.
Figure 1 further shows how the distribution of automation cost shares changes over time:
this shows that the mean automation cost share is rising in the Netherlands, from 0.27% to
0.57% relative to total costs over 2000-2016. All else equal, this implies workers’ exposure to
automation is also rising. Furthermore, besides an increase in the average, there is a fanning
7
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Figure 1: Firm-level automation cost shares over time
0
.5
1
1.
5
A
ut
om
at
io
n 
co
st
 s
ha
re
 (p
er
ce
nt
)
2000 2005 2010 2015
Year
p25 p50 mean
p75 p95
out of the distribution with automation cost shares rising faster for higher percentiles.6
Lastly, we find that automation costs are not correlated with computer investment7, high-
lighting that this is a different type of technology. In a future version of this paper, we will
consider how the impact of automation differs from that of computerization, a more commonly
considered type of technological change.
3 Empirical approach
3.1 Defining automation cost spikes
The main challenge for empirically identifying the worker-level impacts of automation lies in
finding a group of workers who can be used as a control group. A further challenge is to distin-
guish automation events at the firm level, especially when using survey data. Our approach for
both of these challenges is to use what we term automation spikes. In particular, we hypothesize
that spikes in automation cost shares at the firm level signal changes in work processes related
to automation.
6In a future version of this paper, we will additionally consider to what extent this evolution of the automation
cost share distribution is driven by changes within and between firms.
7Computer investment is available in another firm-level survey: the coverage of this survey partially overlaps
with the sample of firms where we observe automation costs.
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We define automation cost spikes as follows. Firm j has an automation cost spike in year
τ if its real automation costs ACjτ relative to real total operating costs (excluding automation
costs) averaged across all other years t 6= τ (TCj,t6=τ ) are at least thrice the average firm-level
cost share (again excluding year τ):
spikejτ = 1
{
ACjτ
TCj,t6=τ
≥ 3× ACj,t6=τ
TCj,t6=τ
}
, (1)
where 1{. . .} denotes the indicator function. As such, a firm that has automation costs around
one percent of all other operating costs for year t 6= τ will be classified as having an automation
spike in t = τ if its automation costs in τ exceed three percent of average operating costs over
years t 6= τ .
Note that this is a firm-specific measure, intended to identify automation events that are
large for the firm, independent of that firm’s initial automation expenditure level. As such, this
indicator does not mechanically correlate with firm characteristics such as firm size, sector, or
capital-intensity. Although we could possibly exploit the size of the automation spike, this is
not our baseline specification for a number of reasons. Firstly, there may be measurement error
in the survey variable making it more difficult to measure the exact size of a spike. Secondly,
we use the automation costs survey variable to flag automation events, but other (indirect)
costs may be incurred which are not directly surveyed: as such, our baseline approach identifies
automation events without taking a strong stance on their exact size.8
3.2 Summary statistics on automation cost spikes
We now document the existence and frequency of automation spikes by firm and sector. In order
to identify spikes, we need at least three years of automation cost data at the firm level: this is
the sample of 36,085 firms described above.
Table 4 shows that close to two-thirds of firms never spike, whereas the remaining third spike
at least once over the 16 years of observation. Note that non-spiking firms do not necessarily
have zero automation costs: it is just that their automation expenditures do not fluctuate much
as a percentage of total costs, implying they do not undergo large automation events as we
define them. Out of the firms that do have such an event, the large majority spikes only once
8Preliminary results varying the spike size threshold do suggest impacts are larger when using more stringent
spike definitions. We therefore also report results scaled by the absolute size of the average automation spike,
below.
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over 2000-2016, although some spike twice and up to four times at most.
Figure 2 shows what automation spikes look like on average across firms where spikes are
observed. This is constructed by defining time relative to the spike year, such that all spikes
line up in t = 0. When firms spike multiple times, we only include the largest spike. Note that
this is not a balanced panel of firms: rather, all 12,278 spiking firms are observed in t = 0, and
the number of observations for other years depends on when the spike took place (if in the first
year of data, there are no observations for t < 0; if in the last year, there are no observations
for t > 0), and on how often the firm enters in the automation survey. Nevertheless, we see a
clear spike pattern.
Figure 3 restricts the sample to treated firms and our estimation window: these are the
spikes we can actually use for identification of treatment. This shows that these automation
events are quite cleanly identified – automation events are not preceded by a substantial lead-up
of automation spending relative to total costs, nor is there evidence of much slow tapering off
afterwards. Rather, automation spike years stand out as years when the firm made a large
(relative to its normal automation expenditure share) investment in automation. Figure 4 plots
this same graph but for the implied level of automation expenditure, showing that the average
firm-level automation spike amounts to an investment of close to 200K euros, compared to a
usual level of around 70K euros in years close to the spike, as shown in Figure 4. Of course,
larger firms have higher absolute levels of expenditure: if we weight these numbers by firms’
number of workers in t = −1, we find that the average spike size is 4.0 million euros, compared
to 1.2 million euros on average in other years.9
The existence of these automation cost spikes is consistent with a literature on lumpy in-
vestment (Haltiwanger et al. 1999; Doms and Dunne 1998). Indeed, such spikes occur when
the investment is irreversible and there are important indivisibilities. Under uncertainty, ir-
reversibility creates an option value to waiting (Pindyck 1991; Nilsen and Schiantarelli 2003);
whereas indivisibilities can arise from fixed adjustment costs (Rothschild 1971) – together, this
implies investment occurs in relatively infrequent episodes of disproportionately large quantities.
It is plausible that investments in automation meet these two criteria: major automation invest-
ments likely include both substantial irreversible investments, for example in terms of worker
training or from developing custom software; as well as introduce fixed adjustment costs from
9In Figures 15 and 16 in the Appendix, we show that the same patterns hold when considering an entirely
balanced sample of treatment firms where we observe automation cost share information in every single year.
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Table 4: Firm-level automation spike frequency
Nr of spikes Frequency Percent
0 23,807 66.0%
1 9,572 26.5%
2 2,297 6.4%
3 359 1.0%
4 46 0.1%
Notes: Total N firms is 36,085.
Figure 2: All firm-level automation cost share spikes
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reorganizing production processes.
3.3 An event study differences-in-differences design
We now outline our empirical design to leverage the observed automation cost spikes for identi-
fication. Three measures help identification. Firstly, as mentioned above, automation spikes are
by definition a big event for the firm – by construction, this is not “run-of-the-mill” automation,
aiding identification. The idea is that such major events help distinguish the effects from other
factors that might affect worker outcomes by making the signal strong relative to the noise.
This is especially important since our automation cost measure – albeit an official bookkeeping
term– derives from a survey.
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Figure 3: Automation cost share spikes for treated firms
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Figure 4: Automation cost spike level for treated firms
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Secondly, we assume that the timing of automation cost spikes is essentially random con-
ditional on observables. This means that for each treatment group of workers experiencing a
spike in a given year, we can select a control group of workers at firms that spike in a later year.
The workers and firms in the control group should have similar observed and unobserved char-
acteristics to the treatment group. Third, we match the control group workers to the treatment
group workers.
Our use of timing differences across firms is in the spirit of a recent literature exploiting
event timing differences in other contexts, e.g. see Duggan et al. (2016); Fadlon and Nielsen
(2017); Miller (2017); Lafortune et al. (2018). In the context of automation, our identification
relies in part on the nature of major automation events. Indeed, as argued above, because these
investments typically involve both uncertainty about the payoff and irreversible investments,
they can create substantial option value to waiting to invest. This means that small differences
in the payoffs to automating can generate substantial differences in the timing of investment.10
This sensitivity implies that small, idiosyncratic differences can change the exact timing of
automation events across firms. Consequently, cohorts of firms that spike a few years apart
should have similar characteristics, their workers should also have similar characteristics on
average, and can thus serve as a counterfactual. For each treatment cohort we define a control
group of workers from firms that spike 5 or more years after the treatment cohort.
Given this assumption, we can use a differences-in-differences (DiD) model where treatment
is based on automation spike timing. Our worker-level event study DiD specification is
yijt = α+ βtreati +
4∑
t6=−1;t=−3
γt × It +
4∑
t6=−1;t=−3
δt × It × treati + λXijt + εijt, (2)
where i indexes workers, j firms, and t time, henceforth measured as years relative to the
automation spike in period τ , i.e. t ≡ year− τ . yijt is the outcome variable (such as total wage
earnings, annual days in non-employment, wages conditional on working, and firm separation),
and treati is a treatment indicator, equal to 1 for worker i if their firm is experiencing an
automation spike at time t = 0, and 0 otherwise (i.e. if their firm spikes in t = 5 or later).
Further, It are indicators for time relative to the spike year, where we choose t ∈ {−3, 4},
with t = −1 as the reference category. Lastly, Xijt are controls: these are a set of worker
characteristics (age and age squared, gender, and nationality); sector and size class of the spiking
10For example, Bessen (1999) finds that a 6 percent payoff difference generated a decade difference in when
firms chose to switch from mule-spinning to ring-spinning in the British textile industry.
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firm; as well as fixed effects for years. We cluster standard errors at the worker level.
Workers at a firm are treated in year t if that firm undergoes an automation cost share spike
(or its largest automation cost spike if multiple spikes are observed) in year t, and is not observed
to spike again during the estimation window (t = −3 to t = 4). Control group workers are those
employed at firms who spike at t+5 or later, but not during the estimation window. We exclude
both treatment and control group firms with multiple spikes in the estimation window such that
estimates of pretrends and treatment lags are not contaminated.11
In the event study differences-in-differences (DiD) literature, never-treated units are some-
times used for identification as well (e.g. see Miller 2017; Lafortune et al. 2018). Our speci-
fication, however, only considers workers who are employed in firms that spike at some point
over 2000-2016: we exclude workers at firms that never spike. As such, our specification strictly
exploits differences in event timing rather than also using event incidence for identification. We
make this choice since including firms that never experience an automation spike may be on
different growth trajectories, leading to different outcomes for their workers.12
Further, we divide treated workers into two groups, incumbent workers and recent hires. We
define incumbent workers as those who have been at the same firm for at least three years prior
to the treatment year. On average across firms, 64 percent of workers are incumbents (where
the median is 70 percent) in t− 1. Incumbent workers at a firm are treated in year t if that firm
undergoes an automation cost share spike (or its first automation cost spike if multiple spikes
are observed) in year t. Incumbent workers at firms who spike at t + 5 or later are used as
controls. These incumbent workers are similar to definitions used in the mass lay-off literature
(e.g. see Jacobson et al. 1993). Dutch labor law typically ensures that temporary contracts are
of a maximum duration of two years, implying that workers with three years of tenure are very
likely to have a stable working relationship with the firm.
The second group of treated workers we identify are those with less than three years of
firm tenure prior to the automation event: compared to incumbent workers, these workers
have been hired relatively recently – we therefore refer to them as recent hires. This worker
group is more likely to hold temporary contracts, which could imply different treatment effects.
11Although this sample restriction conceptually provides for cleaner identification, our results are similar when
not imposing this restriction.
12An additional consideration is that we do not observe firms with fewer than 50 employees in the survey in
all years: firms where we do not observe at least three automation cost observations may still experience an
(unobserved) automation event yet be assigned to the control group when including never-spikers, leading to
possible contamination of the treatment effect estimate.
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Moreover, causal identification of the treatment effect for recent hires could prove more difficult
as they may have been hired in anticipation of the automation event. We therefore analyze them
separately, and generally put more stock in our results for incumbent workers.
In equation 2, the parameters of interest are δt: these estimate period t treatment effect
(t > 0) relative to pre-treatment period t = −1. As with all DiD models, identification requires
parallel trends in the absence of treatment. Our timing strategy provides some support for the
parallel trends assumption. Assuming that later-spiking firms have very similar worker and firm
characteristics to the treatment firms, we expect outcome variables to follow similar trends in
a counterfactual without treatment. We can strengthen identification further by matching on
worker and firm observables to ensure that δt = 0 for all t < 0, making the assumption of parallel
trends more plausible (Azoulay et al. 2010).
In our baseline specification, we match treated and control group workers on pre-treatment
annual real wage income, separately by sector and calendar year. While the match is exact for
calendar year and sector, we use coarsened exact matching (CEM, see Iacus et al. 2012; Blackwell
et al. 2009) for pre-treatment income. To this end, we construct separate strata for each 10
percentiles of real wage income, as well as separate bins for the 99th and 99.9th percentiles, and
a bin for zero income for recent hires, in each of the three pre-treatment years t = −3,−2,−1.
We then match treated workers to control group workers for each of these income bins, while
additionally requiring them to be observed in the same calendar year, and work in the same
sector one year prior to treatment. We include calendar year and sector matching to ensure we
are not capturing sector-specific business cycle effects, or other unobserved time-varying shocks
affecting workers based on their original sector of employment. As such, each treated worker is
matched to a set of controls from the same calendar and sector and belongs to the same pre-
treatment earnings percentile bin. For recent hires, we additionally require them to experience
similar trends in non-employment duration before treatment13 – for incumbents, this dimension
is less relevant since incumbents are employed in the pre-treatment period by definition. This
procedure results in 30,247 strata for incumbents and 82,942 strata for recent hires, and in doing
so can match 98 percent of treated incumbents (using 93 percent of control group incumbents)
and 95 percent of treated recent hires (using 65 percent of control group recent hires).14 While
13In particular, we estimate a linear trend in non-employment duration for individual recent hires before treat-
ment, and match treat and control group recent hires using four bins of this trend: up to the 10th percentile, the
10th percentile to the median, the median to the 90th percentile and higher than the 90th percentile.
14Note that some strata may not contain any treated workers, in which case they are irrelevant for estimation.
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we could refine the matching procedure further by increasing the number of strata, this comes at
the cost of external validity, as a lower share of treated individuals would be matched.15 After
matching, our sample contains 1, 165, 244 unique incumbent workers and 473, 190 unique recent
hires: given our observation window of 8 years (t = −3 through t = 4) this results in 9, 321, 952
observations for incumbents and 3, 785, 520 for recent hires.
This matching procedure ensures that outcome variables in most of the analyses below exhibit
no significant pre-trends from years t = −3 through t = −1. Further support for the parallel
trends assumption comes from Table 10 in Appendix A.1. This table compares observables
across the treatment and control groups using matching weights. The two groups are closely
matched on a wide range of variables for both firms and workers. In Appendix A.3 we check our
results by additionally matching on pre-treatment employment growth at the firm level: this
produces similar results, supporting the robustness of our identification.
More generally, Table 9 in Appendix A.1 shows summary statistics for incumbent and re-
cently hired workers, showing averages and standard deviations across the balanced panel of
workers and years. On average, recent hires earn lower wages and spend a higher number of
days in non-employment compared to incumbents (76 versus 29 days annually). They also have
higher benefit receipts, and are more likely to be female, and younger. Compared to incumbents,
recent hires are overrepresented in larger firms, and are most commonly employed in firms in
administrative and support activities, whereas incumbent workers are most often observed in
the manufacturing sector.
Our estimation sample for identifying treated and control group workers contains 6, 915
unique firms, all of which experience an automation spike at some point over the period. Workers
employed at 2, 753 of these firms are treated (that is, experience an automation spike early in
the observation window), and workers at 5, 301 firms serve as controls (that is, are experiencing
an automation spike later). Workers at 1, 139 firms are treated while its workers also serve as
controls for workers at another treated firm either earlier or later in the sample period. In total,
we observe 1, 165, 244 unique incumbent workers (115, 698 of whom are treated) and 473, 190
unique recent hires (94, 757 of whom are treated)16 – all of these workers are employed at a firm
in t = −1 that spikes at some point over 2000-2016. Note that incumbents and recent hires from
both treated and control groups may move to never-spiking firms after t = −1.
15Further refinement of these strata does not change our results, although it leads to a smaller percentage of
treated workers matched.
16This corresponds to around 20% of the total number of employed persons in the Netherlands over this period.
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4 Impacts on wage income
In this section, we consider how workers’ wage income evolves as the result of an automation
event. We consider impacts on both incumbent workers and recent hires. Subsequent sections
will decompose these income impacts into employment (section 5) and wage (section 6) effects,
and consider to what extent income impacts are offset by various benefit payments (section 7).
Figure 5 shows the impact of automation events on annual real wage income in euros, sepa-
rately for incumbent workers (3+ years of firm tenure) and recent hires. We scale each individual
worker’s wage income by their real wage income level one year before the automation spike, to
obtain relative impacts.17 That is, it shows estimates of equation 2, where the outcome variable
is annual real wage income (in 2010 euros) over t = −1 real income. Firstly, there are only
negligible pre-trends in wage earnings for either incumbents and recent hires.
The estimates for incumbents, shown in black, highlight that these workers lose income
as the result of an automation event. Indeed, in the automation year, incumbent workers
lose some 0.7 percent in wage income and this effect increases over time, cumulating to 8.2
percent in total after five years. Estimates are statistically significant for all treatment and
post-treatment years. Given that annual earnings grow by 1.6 percent annually on average, this
reflects a non-negligible loss compared to usual earnings trajectories. In levels, this corresponds
to approximately 257 euros lost for the average worker in the treatment year (0.7 percent of the
average pre-treatment income of 36,706 euros, see Table 10); and 3,010 euros after 5 years in
total (0.082 × 36,706). This is evidence in favor of automation leading to labor-displacement
for workers: compared to workers employed at firms who automate later, workers employed
at currently automating firms experience income losses. The accumulation of effects over time
is consistent with incumbent workers likely having open-ended contracts, making it costly to
fire them. These gradual changes could in part also result from a time delay in the effective
implementation of automation technologies relative to the cost outlay, or because it takes time
for workers and firms to learn about changes to their match quality under the new technology.
For recent hires, shown in gray in Figure 5, we find no such income losses. Relative to
recent hires in the control group, these workers actually have a 4.4 percent higher income in
total over five years following an automation spike (corresponding to around 959 euros from
a pre-treatment average income of 21,791 euros, see Table 10). However, this five-year effect
17This is preferable to log income impacts since this would eliminate zeros: this approach is also taken in e.g.
Autor et al. (2014). In appendix A.2 we additionally show impacts in levels.
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is only just statistically significant, and no significant impact on wage income is found in the
automation year. This could be the case because recent hires have built up less firm-specific
human capital, and therefore are more able to adapt to new job tasks either within the same
firm or when moving to a new employer. This is consistent with Carneiro et al. (2015); Lefranc
(2003), who finds that income losses following displacement result mostly from accumulated
firm-specific human capital. Note that it may also be the case that recent hires do not lose
income because these workers are in part hired in anticipation of the automation event – in this
case their outcomes are endogenous to the event. However, as we will show below, recent hires
also experience increased separation from their firms, suggesting endogeneity cannot account for
the entire observed difference with incumbents.
All in all, the results in Figure 5 highlight that automation negatively affects the wage
incomes of workers with longer firm tenures employed at the automating firm. To further scale
these costs, we calculate the incumbent worker income losses resulting from one hundred euros
spent on additional automation during an automation event. For incumbent workers on average,
100 euros spent on automation during an automation event results in the loss of 0.5 euros of
income for the firm’s incumbent workers in that same year, and 6 euros after five years.18 The
same calculation for recent hires reveals that 100 euros spent during an automation spike leads to
an income gain of 0.6 euros of income in total after five years – this effect is an order of magnitude
smaller than the 5-year loss for incumbents both because recent hires experience smaller income
gains from automation than incumbents’ losses, and because the former on average are employed
in firms with larger automation spike sizes.19
In Appendix A.3, we show that these results are robust to a number of alternative model
specifications. In particular, we remove outlier firms in terms of employment changes (those
experiencing an employment change exceeding 90 percent in any one year); and eliminate firms
that experience a range of firm-level events (such as take-overs, mergers, and acquisitions; re-
structuring; and firm splits) either in the pre-treatment period or over the entire event estimation
window. This alleviates the concern that unobserved firm-level events correlated with automa-
18For the average incumbent worker, firm-level automation costs during a spike year are 2.12 millions of euros.
Since there are 2,753 treated firms, total automation event expenditures in our sample amount to 5,836 millions
of euros. At the same time, 257 euros are lost per incumbent worker in the year of the automation event on
average (3,010 euros in total over five years)– and the total number of (matched) unique incumbent workers in
these firms is 115,698. Hence, 30 million euros of labor income is lost to incumbent workers in the year of the
automation event (348 million euros over five years).
19There are 94,757 (matched) unique recent hires in treated firms, and the automation cost spike they experience
on average is 5.36 million euros.
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Figure 5: Annual real wage income, relative to t = −1
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
E
ar
ni
ng
s 
re
la
tiv
e 
to
 t=
-1
 e
ar
ni
ng
s 
(%
)
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
Time relative to largest automation spike
Incumbents Recent hires
Notes: N=9,321,952 for incumbents; 3,785,520 for recent hires. Whiskers represent 95 percent
confidence intervals.
tion spikes are driving our results. Further, we additionally match workers across firms with
similar pre-treatment employment growth trajectories: this eliminates the concern that while
individual treated and control group workers are on similar earnings and employment trajec-
tories, firms need not be. Throughout, we find substantial income losses for incumbents, and
much less evidence of such effects for recent hires (with estimates either positive but small, or
statistically insignificant).
We now consider to what extent workers are effectively displaced from their firms, and then
analyze to what extent the average annual income effects found here are due to changes in
annual days worked after firm separation, or from changes in daily wage trajectories conditional
on employment.
5 Impacts on firm separation and employment
The annual wage impacts found above may be driven by changes in days worked, changes in
daily wages conditional on being employed, or a combination of both. Here we consider the first
of these adjustment margins: do workers separate from their firms as a result of automation,
19
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and does this lead to non-employment spells?20
To answer this question, we first consider displacement effects in their most literal sense:
does automation result in pre-existing workers leaving the firm? Figure 6 considers the impact
of automation on firm separation by presenting estimates from equation 2, where the dependent
variable is a dummy for the worker separating from the pre-treatment employer. All coefficients
have been multiplied by 100, such that the effects are in percentage points. As before, we
estimate the model separately for incumbents and recent hires. This highlights that workers’
probability of separating from their employer following an automation spike is rising over time
compared to control group workers, for both incumbents and recent hires.
Indeed, in the automation year, the separation probability for incumbent workers is 2.1
percentage points higher, where the (matched) control group incumbent separation probability
is 13 percent, such that the automation-year effect corresponds to a 16 percent rise in firm
separation for these workers. Cumulatively after five years, incumbents have a 8.6 percentage
point higher chance of firm separation: this is a 24 percent rise compared to the average five-year
(cumulative) chance of firm separation among control group workers of 36 percent).
Recent hires experience a 4.1 percentage point increase in the chance of firm separation in
the year of the automation event. Although higher in absolute terms compared to the effect
for incumbents, this is lower relative to the average separation chance of 35 percent among the
(matched) control group for that year. Further, the cumulative treatment effect on separation
probability for recent hires grows somewhat less over time – these different dynamics compared
to incumbents could be the result of a higher prevalence of temporary contracts, allowing recent
hires to be laid off more quickly. In total after five years, recent hires have a 7.2 percentage
point higher chance to have separated from the automating firm, an increase of 10.3 percent
over the 70 percent separation probability for the control group over that same period.
All in all, this suggests both incumbents and recent hires are more likely to separate from
their employer as a result of automation. For incumbents, the resulting increase in separation
is substantially higher relative to what they experience in the absence of an automation event –
this effect is less sizable for recent hires, who have a higher separation probability at baseline.
Although this increase in firm separation implies automation leads to displacement for the firm’s
20Any adjustment in days worked can in principle come from either the intensive or extensive margin: that
is, workers may work fewer days with their current employer, or separate from their employer and experience a
non-employment spell before finding re-employment. However, we do not find any evidence of intensive margin
changes in non-employment– as such, any change found here reflects adjustments along the extensive margin.
20
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pre-existing workers, it need not translate to income losses if these workers find re-employment
quickly (and at similar wage rates): we now first consider impacts on non-employment.
Results are shown in Figure 7, where we define the dependent variable in equation 2 as
the annual number of days spent in non-employment. Note that incumbents are by definition
employed in the three years prior to the automation event – although they need not work full-
time, their number of days in non-employment does not evolve much prior to t = 0. Starting
in the year in which the automation spike takes place, however, their days worked gradually
decreases. In particular, non-employment increases by 1.2 day in the automation event year,
and this increases to around 5.2 days annually four years after the automation event, with a
total cumulative increase in non-employment of 15.7 days compared to the control group. In
the event year, matched control group incumbents spend around 22 days in non-employment on
average, suggesting automation produces an increase of 5.4 percent in non-employment in the
automation year itself. The cumulative five-year impact corresponds to 71 percent of this average
treatment-year non-employment duration; and a 9.1 percent increase relative to the five-year
cumulative non-employment duration (172 days) experienced by control group incumbents.
Unlike incumbents, new hires do not experience any statistically significant changes in non-
employment as a result of automation, despite their increased firm separation rates. Indeed, the
cumulated five-year impact is only an increase of 1.2 days in non-employment, which besides not
being statistically significant is a negligible number compared to the control group’s cumulated
five-year non-employment duration of 357 days.
These findings suggest that while both incumbents and recent hires separate from the firm at
a higher rate as a result of automation, the former experience a non-negligible increase in non-
employment whereas the latter move on to new jobs quite seamlessly. These different adjustment
costs to displacement may be the result of incumbent workers having accumulated more (firm-
specific) human capital which is depreciating in the face of automation. Also note that besides
having higher firm-tenure, incumbents are on average around 5 years older than recent hires (see
Table 10 in the Appendix). A further explanation could therefore be that compared to recent
hires, incumbents had achieved a better firm-match prior to the automation event. If recent
hires were not that well-matched with the firm in the first place (as also indicated by their higher
baseline leave probability, and consistent with evidence in Fredriksson et al. (2018)), finding a
similar or better match after separation may be easier.21
21This hypothesis may be investigated more directly using the methodology pioneered by Abowd et al. (1999)
21
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Figure 6: Firm separation probability
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Notes: N=9,321,952 for incumbents; 3,785,520 for recent hires. Whiskers represent 95 percent
confidence intervals. Effects at t = −2 and t = −3 are zero by definition since incumbents are
at the firm for three years before t = 0, and recent hires are in the sample conditional on being
observed in the firm in t = −1.
in estimating worker-firm match quality.
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Figure 7: Annual number of days in non-employment
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confidence intervals.
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Figure 8: Log daily wages conditional on employment
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Notes: N=9,321,952 for incumbents; 3,785,520 for recent hires. Whiskers represent 95 percent
confidence intervals.
6 Impacts on daily wages
We now turn to the wage impacts of automation. In Figure 8, we consider the effect of automa-
tion on log daily wages (conditional on employment), for both incumbent workers and recent
hires. Recall that we do not observe daily hours worked in our data: changes in daily wages can
therefore result from changes in hourly wages and/or changes in daily hours worked. We find
statistically significant but economically very small negative daily wage losses of at most 0.8
percent four years after the automation event for incumbents and 1.4 percent for recent hires.22
The absence of substantial daily wage effects implies that the income losses incumbent workers
experience are almost entirely accounted for by firm separation followed by non-employment
spells.
Of course, these wage effects combine effects across job leavers and job stayers, which may
cancel out on average – we therefore also estimate our daily wage models separately for these
two groups, relative to control group workers of job leavers and job stayers, respectively.
Figures 9 and 10 consider how daily wages evolve, in log points, for treated versus control
22Together with the effect on days in non-employment, these estimates on daily wages provide a decomposition
of the total wage income effect shown in section 4.
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Figure 9: Log daily wages conditional on employment, firm leavers
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Notes: N=2,591,038 for incumbents; 2,197,693 for recent hires. Whiskers represent 95 percent
confidence intervals.
group workers who leave or stay at their firm, respectively. This reveals only very limited het-
erogeneity across these two groups: we find very small negative wage impacts from automation
for both incumbents and recent hires who leave their firm, and no statistically significant effects
for those who remain. This suggests automation does not lead to substantial wage losses for
these workers.
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Figure 10: Log daily wages conditional on employment, firm stayers
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Notes: N=6,410,742 for incumbents; 1,115,624 for recent hires. Whiskers represent 95 percent
confidence intervals.
7 Impacts on alternative income sources
So far, we have shown that incumbent workers experience income losses as a result of automation
in their firm, cumulating to around 3,010 euros on average per incumbent worker over the five-
year post-treatment window. These losses are almost entirely driven by higher firm-separation
probabilities accompanied by non-employment spells, raising the question to what extent various
benefit systems are absorbing these impacts. Figure 11 considers total benefit receipts (in annual
real 2010 euros), comprised of unemployment benefits, disability benefits, and welfare payments,
as well as the separate contributions from these three different sources.23
We find that incumbent workers do receive additional benefit income following an automation
event: however, after five years, the cumulative amount is around 446 euros on average, implying
that only 15 percent of the negative wage income impact is offset.24 This finding is comparable
to that in other worker displacement events, where typically only a small part of the negative
impact is compensated by social security (Hardoy and Schøne 2014). Figure 11 further shows
23Since we do not find any non-employment increases for recent hires, we only consider these impacts for
incumbent workers.
24We find similar percentages of income loss offset when using different spike threshold cutoffs and/or longer
observation windows.
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Figure 11: Annual real benefit income
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Notes: N=9,321,952 (incumbents only). Benefits are the sum of received unemployment and
disability benefits, and welfare. Whiskers represent 95 percent confidence intervals.
that all of the benefit payments for incumbents arise from unemployment insurance: this is
expected, as unemployment benefit eligibility is very high among workers with at least three
years of firm tenure.25 Consistent with high unemployment benefit eligibility, we do not see any
contribution from welfare payments for incumbents. Lastly, disability benefits26 are actually
slightly decreasing over time. Since all incumbents were previously employed, this implies some
were working part-time and receiving benefits for a partial disability prior to the automation
event. Further analysis shows that the decline in disability insurance receipts is driven by
incumbents who find re-employment – that is, they no longer receive these benefits with their
new employer.
Besides benefits and welfare payments, displaced workers could also adjust by entering self-
employment: since self-employment income is not observed in our data, we may be overesti-
mating the income losses workers experience. Indeed, Figure 12 shows that treated incumbents
are somewhat more likely to enter self-employment following an automation event, although
25For most of the observation period, eligible workers in the Netherlands are entitled to up to 38 weeks of
unemployment benefits following job loss.
26Disability benefits in the Netherlands cover impairment whether full or partial, and whether temporary or
permanent, and replace up to 70-75 percent of workers’ past wages. Benefits are financed by employers without
worker contributions, and there is a long history of the use of these schemes in the Netherlands as hidden
unemployment (Koning and Lindeboom 2015).
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Figure 12: Probability of entering self-employment or early retirement
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Notes: N=9,321,952 (incumbents only). Whiskers represent 95 percent confidence intervals.
the effect is very small indeed – 0.3 percentage points cumulated over five years (relative to
a five-year probability of 5.2 percent among the control group), suggesting this cannot be an
important compensating income source. Lastly, we find evidence that automation also leads to
impacts on early retirement (defined as the receipt of retirement benefits prior to reaching the
legal retirement age of 65), as shown in Figure 12. These effects are larger: four years after
the automation event, treated incumbent workers are 0.4 percentage points more likely to be
observed in early retirement, whereas the average five-year probability of early retirement among
control-group incumbents is around 1.7 percent. As such, the treatment effect represents a 24
percent increase in the incidence of early retirement.
Taken together, these results show that the documented income losses experienced by automation-
impacted workers are only partially offset by benefit systems, implying automation-affected
workers largely bear the cost themselves.
8 Effect heterogeneity
So far, we have shown income losses for incumbent workers driven by non-employment spells,
only partially compensated by benefit payments. For recent hires, on the other hand, automation
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does not lead to substantial income losses. Here, we investigate further how different types of
workers are affected: in particular, we consider workers by age, gender, and wage quartile. In
Appendix A.2 we additionally consider differences by workers’ initial sector of employment and
firm size, as well as two alternative skill measures.
For each of the groups considered here, we contrast the effect against the same group at the
control firm by using an interaction term – this results in a decomposition of the mean effects
found in previous sections. In particular, we estimate the following model:
yijt = α+βtreati+γpostit+δ0×treati×postit+
∑
k
[δk × treati × postit × zki]+λXijt+εijt, (3)
where, as before, i indexes workers, j firms, and t time relative to the automation spike. For
succinctness, we estimate the average annual effect over the entire post-treatment period rather
than reporting the year-by-year coefficients. As such, postit is a dummy variable indicating the
post-treatment period (i.e. t ≥ 0). Further, zki is a dimension of worker heterogeneity, such as
gender, age in the year before automation, or age-specific wage rank, containing k categories. In
addition to the controls included in equation 2, Xijt also contains zki as well as the interaction
terms zki× treati and zki× postit. In equation 3, δ0 gives the estimated treatment effect for the
reference group, and δk the deviation from that effect for category k of worker characteristic zi.
Throughout this section, we will show effects on relative earnings, firm separation, non-
employment duration, and log daily wages (conditional on employment). While the impacts on
relative earnings are a good summary measure, any given income loss may come about through
different channels (e.g. wage changes versus non-employment changes) for different workers.
Lastly, we also show results for the probability of early retirement.
8.1 Worker age
We first consider how automation affects workers of different age groups: those younger than 30
years old, between the ages of 30 and 39, 40 and 49, and 50 years and older: results are shown
in Table 5. In this table, coefficients are shown for the reference category, workers below the age
of 30, and the remaining estimates represent deviations from this reference group. We consider
impacts on relative earnings, the firm separation probability, non-employment duration, log
daily wages (conditional on employment), and the probability of early retirement – coefficients
in columns 1, 2, 4, and 5 have been multiplied by 100 to represent percentage point impacts for
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relative earnings, firm separation, and early retirement, and log point impacts for daily wages.
Panel A presents estimates for incumbent workers, and panel B for recent hires.
The oldest incumbent workers experience the largest income losses: 2.3 percent annually
on average over 5 years. Qualitatively, we see a similar pattern among recent hires, with the
difference that these losses (of -0.9 percent annually) are not statistically different from zero.
However, the patterns of displacement from the firm by age category do differ between
incumbents and recent hires. In particular, for recent hires, the probability of displacement
increases monotonically with age, with the oldest recent hires 6.7 percentage points more likely
to leave the firm than the youngest workers. This suggests younger recent hires may be better
able to deal with any automation-driven workplace changes. Among incumbents, on the other
hand, the youngest workers are most likely to leave the firm, but differences with older workers
are smaller (these differences range between 0.5 to 1.6 percentage points and are not always
statistically significant). This may be related to “last-in first-out” policies among high-tenure
workers, but also possibly reflects younger workers’ higher flexibility in terms of job transitions.
These age-dependent costs of job transitions are also reflected in non-employment durations,
which are monotonically increasing in age for incumbents, despite older incumbents not having
a higher separation probability. Indeed, the youngest incumbents do not experience any statisti-
cally significant increase in non-employment duration, although workers of all other age groups
do. Among recent hires, we do not find any statistically significant increases in non-employment
duration for any group, even for older workers.
Log daily wage effects (which are only defined for workers with non-zero wages, i.e. those in
employment) are economically very small for incumbents of all ages. For recent hires, however,
we do find one group which loses a somewhat larger amount: workers over the age of 50 have
2.3% lower wages annually. These effects are not visible in the average (reported above) since
older workers are only a small fraction of the group of recent hires, and because the youngest
workers gain 1.1% annually.
Lastly, and unsurprisingly, the early retirement effects found above are entirely driven by
workers over the age of 50, particularly incumbents.
Taken together, these results show that older workers generally bear more of the cost of
automation-driven displacement: they either experience longer non-employment durations or
enter early retirement (as is the case for incumbents), or have higher firm separation probabilities
and lower daily wages (as is the case for recent hires).
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Table 5: Effect heterogeneity by worker age
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Relative wage Firm separation Non-employm. Log daily Early retirem.
income probability duration wage probability
Panel A. Incumbents
Age <30 (ref) -0.73 5.79*** 0.66 -0.64** -0.00
(0.56) (0.37) (0.53) (0.23) (0.01)
Deviations from reference group for:
Age 30-39 -1.19 -1.58*** 2.23*** -0.17 0.01
(0.62) (0.44) (0.63) (0.27) (0.01)
Age 40-49 -0.83 -0.46 2.60*** 0.60* 0.01
(0.61) (0.43) (0.62) (0.27) (0.01)
Age 50+ -1.56* -1.02* 4.33*** 0.65* 0.83***
(0.64) (0.44) (0.72) (0.29) (0.11)
Observations 9,319,736 9,319,736 9,319,736 8,999,617 9,319,736
Panel B. Recent hires
Age <30 (ref) 2.26* 3.08*** 0.63 1.05*** 0.01
(0.92) (0.30) (0.71) (0.31) (0.01)
Deviations from reference group for:
Age 30-39 -2.24 1.96*** 1.03 -1.77*** -0.02
(1.29) (0.44) (1.02) (0.44) (0.02)
Age 40-49 1.12 5.19*** -0.82 -1.12* -0.06
(1.48) (0.50) (1.16) (0.49) (0.03)
Age 50+ -3.13 6.74*** 1.11 -3.37*** 0.49**
(1.91) (0.64) (1.52) (0.71) (0.18)
Observations 3,785,520 3,785,520 3,785,520 3,313,317 3,785,520
Notes: All coefficients are average annual effects over the post-treatment period (t = 0 through
t = 4), and coefficients in columns 1, 3, 4, and 5 have been multiplied by 100. Workers under
the age of 30 are the reference group. Log daily wages are observed conditional on employment.
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.
8.2 Worker gender
There are only modest differences in how male and female workers are affected by automation
events at their firm, as shown in Table 6. Indeed, there are virtually no gender differences in
most outcomes – wage earnings, firm separation rates, and wages conditional on employment–
for either incumbents or recent hires. Female workers do experience a somewhat lower non-
employment duration than male workers, for both incumbents and recent hires – but these
differences are not statistically significant. The only margin where gender differences are detected
is early retirement: virtually the entire observed increase in early retirement is driven by male
workers, both among incumbents and among recent hires.
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Table 6: Effect heterogeneity by worker gender
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Relative wage Firm separation Non-employm. Log daily Early retirem.
income probability duration wage probability
Panel A. Incumbents
Male (ref) -1.69*** 4.92*** 3.36*** -0.37*** 0.32***
(0.17) (0.15) (0.23) (0.08) (0.03)
Deviations from reference group for:
Female 0.11 -0.02 -0.56 0.12 -0.27***
(0.37) (0.29) (0.45) (0.20) (0.05)
Observations 9,319,736 9,319,736 9,319,736 8,999,617 9,319,736
Panel B. Recent hires
Male (ref) 0.94 5.76*** 1.81*** -0.03 0.10**
(0.66) (0.24) (0.54) (0.21) (0.03)
Deviations from reference group for:
Female 0.07 -0.64 -1.57 -0.52 -0.11*
(1.11) (0.38) (0.87) (0.39) (0.05)
Observations 3,785,520 3,785,520 3,785,520 3,313,317 3,785,520
Notes: All coefficients are average annual effects over the post-treatment period (t = 0 through
t = 4), and coefficients in columns 1, 3, 4, and 5 have been multiplied by 100. Male workers
are the reference group. Log daily wages are observed conditional on employment. *p<0.05,
**p<0.01, ***p<0.001.
8.3 Worker wage quartile
Since we only observe education levels for a small and selected subsample of workers, we obtain
a measure of workers’ skill level by calculating each worker’s wage rank by age in t = −1,
calculated separately for incumbents and recent hires. We then groups workers into quartiles
based on this rank. For example, the highest-quartile workers in this measure are those who
earn in the top 25 percent of earnings across the sample for workers of their age in the year
before the automation event.27
Results are reported in Table 7: workers in the lowest residual wage quartile are used as
the reference category throughout. This shows that for incumbents, income losses are increas-
ing monotonically in wage quartiles: the highest-paid workers experience the largest losses,
percentage-wise. Among recent hires, workers in the bottom quartile experience the strongest
increase in income, with no statistically significant effect for workers in higher wage quartiles.
This shows that, across the economy, automation is not biased against lower-wage workers.
Indeed, the firm separation probability is increasing in wage quartile for both incumbents
27As an alternative skill measure, we additionally calculate wage quartiles based on a residual wage regression:
results (reported in Table 11 in the Appendix) are very similar.
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and recent hires. This suggests that “lower-skilled” workers are actually less likely to be affected
by automation events compared to “higher-skilled” workers, where skill is defined by age-specific
wage ranks as described above. However, despite a higher change of firm separation, these higher-
skilled incumbent workers do not experience statistically significantly higher average increases
in non-employment duration, implying they are able to find re-employment more quickly. For
recent hires, we do find some higher non-employment duration increases for the higher-skilled
workers, matching their higher separation rates. However, non-employment duration effects are
lower for recent hires as a group compared to incumbents.
Similar to the average treatment effect, we do not see much action along the daily wage
margin conditional on employment when breaking out effects by age-specific wage quartile.
However, higher-quartile workers do experience slightly stronger daily wage decreases than do
lower-quartile workers. Lastly, early retirement take-up occurs for incumbents across all but the
lowest wage quartile, and for recent hires for the top quartile workers, only.
We should be careful about drawing strong conclusions from these results since they may
be capturing other factors than pure worker skill, such as the quality of the worker-firm match.
However, Table 7 does provide an important insight that is counter to a common intuition:
workers lower down the wage rank for their age (“lower-skilled” workers) are not displaced more
often by automation events: higher-skilled incumbents are actually more likely to be affected and
experience displacement. These findings are broadly confirmed when we estimate our models for
the subset of data where education level data is available, as shown in Table 13 in the Appendix.
These higher losses for higher-skilled workers may of course be the result of differences in the
firms where automation spikes occur: specifically, if larger firms both have bigger automation
spikes and also pay higher wages. While this matters for the average worker’s exposure to
displacement from automation, we are also interested in which workers are displaced within
firms. Therefore, Table 7 reports estimates by workers’ age-specific within-firm wage quartile.
That is, the bottom quartile reflects incumbents (panel A) or recent hires (panel B) who are in
the lowest 25% of their firm’s wage distribution for their age.28
When considering workers by their within-firm wage rank, automation is remarkably neutral
across the “skill” distribution for incumbents: there are no statistically significant differences
in wage losses across the four quartiles, and these workers have very similar probabilities of
28Note that these quartiles cannot be calculated for the smallest firms: however, all our previous findings are
very similar in this subsample, suggesting that this is not driving the results.
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Table 7: Effect heterogeneity by age-specific wage quartile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Relative wage Firm separation Non-employm. Log daily Early retirem.
income probability duration wage probability
Panel A. Incumbents
Bottom quartile (ref) -0.94* 4.25*** 2.75*** 0.31 0.05
(0.39) (0.27) (0.43) (0.18) (0.04)
Deviations from reference group for:
Second quartile -0.63 0.99** 0.63 -0.68** 0.27***
(0.47) (0.36) (0.57) (0.21) (0.07)
Third quartile -0.78 0.97** 0.63 -0.48* 0.25***
(0.47) (0.36) (0.57) (0.22) (0.07)
Top quartile -1.76*** 1.33*** 1.04 -1.00*** 0.22**
(0.49) (0.37) (0.59) (0.24) (0.07)
Observations 9,321,952 9,321,952 9,321,952 9,001,780 9,321,952
Panel B. Recent hires
Bottom quartile (ref) 5.20*** 2.33*** -2.24** 0.58 -0.01
(1.31) (0.33) (0.87) (0.44) (0.05)
Deviations from reference group for:
Second quartile -4.93** 2.29*** 3.80** -0.51 0.03
(1.64) (0.48) (1.22) (0.55) (0.06)
Third quartile -4.46** 7.60*** 4.20*** -0.23 0.08
(1.56) (0.52) (1.20) (0.53) (0.06)
Top quartile -5.71*** 5.66*** 4.19*** -1.46** 0.17*
(1.55) (0.52) (1.14) (0.52) (0.08)
Observations 3,785,520 3,785,520 3,785,520 3,313,317 3,785,520
Notes: All coefficients are average annual effects over the post-treatment period (t = 0 through t = 4),
and coefficients in columns 1, 3, 4, and 5 have been multiplied by 100. Quartile 1 workers are the reference
group. Log daily wages are observed conditional on employment. *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.
leaving the firm. The adjustment mechanisms do differ slightly, with the higher-paid workers
displaced from the firm experiencing larger daily wage losses but lower non-employment increases
compared to workers displaced from firms’ lower wage ranks. Also for recent hires, displacement
effects are neutral across the “skill” groups. However, we see a polarized pattern of wage impacts,
with the bottom and top quartiles experiencing income gains, and no impacts for the middle
two quartiles.
All in all, the results in this section show that the average income losses found earlier are
borne disproportionally by older workers, and workers in higher wage quartiles across the econ-
omy. Within firms, however, automation displaces workers from all ranks of the “skill” distri-
bution at similar rates. Lastly, early retirement effects are entirely driven by (older) males.
In Appendix A.2 we also consider how worker displacement effects from automation differ
by the worker’s firm size and sector. Here, the main takeaway is that although there are some
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Table 8: Effect heterogeneity by age-specific within-firm wage quartile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Relative wage Firm separation Non-employm. Log daily Early retirem.
income probability duration wage probability
Panel A. Incumbents
Bottom quartile (ref) -1.86*** 5.33*** 4.31*** -0.01 0.24***
(0.40) (0.27) (0.44) (0.18) (0.06)
Deviations from reference group for:
Second quartile 0.14 -0.99** -1.49* -0.53* 0.05
(0.50) (0.37) (0.60) (0.23) (0.08)
Third quartile 0.17 -0.51 -1.14 -0.44 0.09
(0.48) (0.37) (0.59) (0.23) (0.08)
Top quartile 0.40 0.11 -2.13*** -0.70** -0.11
(0.50) (0.38) (0.60) (0.25) (0.08)
Observations 9,205,656 9,205,656 9,205,656 8,890,803 9,205,656
Panel B. Recent hires
Bottom quartile (ref) 3.95** 6.54*** -1.82* -0.50 0.04
(1.33) (0.36) (0.85) (0.43) (0.05)
Deviations from reference group for:
Second quartile -4.27* -0.00 3.15* -0.05 -0.03
(1.70) (0.52) (1.23) (0.56) (0.07)
Third quartile -3.40* -0.75 3.87** 0.47 -0.03
(1.64) (0.52) (1.22) (0.54) (0.06)
Top quartile -1.70 0.52 2.78* 1.25* 0.10
(1.65) (0.53) (1.21) (0.55) (0.08)
Observations 3,664,008 3,664,008 3,664,008 3,203,250 3,664,008
Notes: All coefficients are average annual effects over the post-treatment period (t = 0 through t = 4),
and coefficients in columns 1, 3, 4, and 5 have been multiplied by 100. Quartile 1 workers are the reference
group. Log daily wages are observed conditional on employment. *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.
differences in effect size, our findings for incumbents are not driven by workers in a small subset
of sectors or firm sizes. Income losses are larger for incumbents and recent hires displaced from
smaller firms, suggesting we would find larger losses if our data were more representative in
terms of firm size. Further, while incumbents initially employed in manufacturing sectors do
experience some of the larger firm separation and non-employment increases, the automation-
driven displacement effects found for incumbents are pervasive across many different sectors of
the economy. Lastly, overall differences found between incumbents and recent hires are not only
due to their different sectoral or firm size affiliations: manufacturing workers and workers at
the largest firms are displaced from their firms at similar rates whether they are incumbents or
recent hires, but only incumbents experience increases in non-employment and early retirement.
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9 Impacts conditional on firm separation
The above sections document the effects of automation on wage income, finding losses for in-
cumbent workers at automating firms. These estimates are calculated for all incumbent workers
and all recently hired workers who are at the firm the year prior to the major automation event.
However, most of the earnings losses are likely borne just by those workers who leave the firm.
In this section, we consider the worker-level income loss from automation conditional on
separating from the firm by comparing the evolution of wage income for workers who leave the
automating firm (“leavers”) to that of all control group workers (i.e. both leavers and stayers).
This mimics the empirical specification from the displaced worker literature, where earnings
trajectories for workers displaced from firms with annual employment losses exceeding a certain
threshold (usually, 30 percent) are compared to those from control group firms which did not
experience such a displacement event.29
Unsurprisingly, relative losses in wage income are larger among the group of firm leavers
than for the entire group of treated workers: Figure 13 indicates incumbents lose 4.7 percent
in the year of the automation event, and these losses increase to 17.2 percent after five years
(and 57.4 percent cumulatively). Recent hires also lose income, but much less: 0.9 percent in
the automation year and 3.6 percent four years after the event (13.5 percent cumulatively).
As before, these earnings losses are largely driven by non-employment. Incumbent workers
who leave their firm work around 11 fewer days during the year of the automation event and 44
fewer days after 5 years, as seen in Figure 14 – the cumulative effect over 5 years is 149 days.
Non-employment effects are again smaller for recently hired workers: 30 days cumulatively after
5 years. As above (section 6), effects on daily wages are small for both groups (not shown here).
29However, note that our model also differs from the displaced worker literature in that all firms in our sample
experience the event, and we exploit only its timing.
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Figure 13: Annual real wage income, relative to t = −1 and conditional on firm separation
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Notes: N=8,786,432 for incumbents; 3,647,448 for recent hires. Whiskers represent 95 percent
confidence intervals.
Figure 14: Annual number of days in non-employment, conditional on firm separation
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10 Impact comparison to mass layoffs and plant closings
Our evidence confirms that some workers bear a considerable loss of earnings and work following
major automation investments by their employers. But how significant are these losses for social
policy? To gauge the overall magnitude of these losses for society, it helps to have a relevant
metric to compare them to. A natural point of comparison is the displaced worker literature: not
only is there a substantial literature on the costs to workers of mass layoffs and plant closings,
but there is also a history of policy interventions aimed at countering these losses.
To compare the overall impact on the workforce in terms of displacement, we need to compare
the shares of workers separating from their firm each year in these two different types of events.
Firstly, Abbring et al. (2002) find that about 4 percent of workers in both the US and the
Netherlands are displaced each year because of their employers’ adverse economic conditions.
For the US, the estimate is 4.4 percent; for the Netherlands, the estimates range from 3.5 to
7.2 percent. To construct an analogous number for automation events, we need to consider the
probability that any one worker experiences the event in a given year (“event exposure”), and the
probability of firm separation conditional on the event occurring (“event impact”). As for the
former, in out sample, some 9 percent of workers are employed in firms that have an automation
event in any year on average. This is an upper bound for the total workforce population since
our sample is weighted toward larger firms who automate more frequently. As for event impact,
the difference between our automation results and the worker displacement literature is that by
comparison, far fewer workers separate from their firms each year as a result of automation at
the affected firms. The mass layoff studies typically include workplaces where 30 percent or more
of the employees are separated, and even larger portions of the workforce are laid off in studies
of plant closings. In contrast, only 2 percent of incumbent workers leave their employer in the
year of an automation event relative to the control group. Even after 5 years, automation only
accounts for the separation of 8.6 percent of incumbent workers (7.2 percent for recent hires).
Putting event exposure and impact together, the annual separation hazard from automation is
around 0.77 percent (0.086 × 0.09), compared to 4 percent for mass lay-offs. As such, the overall
risk that a worker will separate from their firm in a mass layoff or plant closing in any year is
almost an order of magnitude greater than the risk of firm separation due to automation.
This discussion highlights another difference from findings on mass lay-offs and plant closings:
the impact of automation occurs relatively slowly while the mass layoff literature reports an
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immediate impact followed by a period of adjustment. The slow response may reveal something
about the nature of automation. If automation were a simple story of machines replacing
humans, then most of the job losses would occur the year of the automation event or, perhaps,
the year after. The slow response suggests that automation appears to involve substantial
adjustment costs, perhaps reflecting significant complementarities with workers. For example,
slow adjustment might reflect a learning and selection process: over time, workers learn what
work is like using the new technology and some choose to leave as a result; similarly, employers
learn which workers have the skills to adapt to the new technology and they lay off some
workers or encourage them to leave based on this new knowledge. Further research, including
a consideration of workers hired after the automation event, and a comparison between leaving
workers’ pre- and post-treatment firms may shed some light on the changing nature of employer-
employee matches.
The different time patterns affect comparisons of earnings losses. While workers separated
from their firms by automation experience similar earnings losses to displaced workers in the
fourth year after the event, their initial earnings losses are much lower. Incumbent workers
who leave their employer after an automation event experience an average loss of earnings of
about 17 percent in the fifth year after the event.30 By comparison, Jacobson et al. (1993) find
that long-tenured workers in Pennsylvania experienced a loss of earnings of 25 percent six years
after a mass layoff. Couch and Placzek (2010) find losses of 13 to 15 percent six years after a
mass layoff in another sample.31 However, Jacobson et al. (1993) report an average earnings
loss of over 40 percent immediately following the layoff and Couch and Placzek (2010) report an
immediate loss of 33 percent. The earnings loss during the first year of automation is less than
4 percent by comparison. Thus, the workers displaced from automation have somewhat smaller
cumulative earnings losses than workers experiencing mass layoffs.
A final difference with the worker displacement literature is that automation seems to have
significantly smaller effects on wages. The worker displacement literature reports differing re-
sults regarding the relative importance of wage declines and non-employment in explaining the
observed loss of earnings (see discussion in Hijzen et al. 2010). However, studies that carefully
30The loss of earnings for recently hired workers averages just 3.6 percent four years after the automation
event. We cite the result for incumbent workers because most of the mass layoff literature studies impacts on
long-tenured workers. Note also that the 17 percent figure might overstate the long-term loss of earnings. Because
workers leave over time, the average losses in the fifth year reflect workers who have left their employer relatively
recently; longer term earnings losses may be smaller.
31Couch and Placzek (2010) also review other studies of displaced workers that report long-term average earnings
losses ranging from 7 to 16 percent.
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measure wage effects do find significant long-term declines in wages, sometimes called “wage
scarring”. In the Netherlands specifically, Mooi-Reci and Ganzeboom (2015) find wage declines
following unemployment of 10 percent for men and 17 percent for women. Deelen et al. (2018)
study the impact of firm closures and find immediate wage declines of 4 and 6 percent for prime-
age and older workers, respectively; and 3 percent wage declines 6 years after the closure. In
contrast, our study finds wages declines of at most 1 percent for both incumbent and recently
hired workers who leave following automation, both immediately after the event and in subse-
quent years.32 Our evidence suggests that automation induces relatively little wage scarring,
even for workers with relatively long firm tenure.33
To summarize, compared to mass layoffs and plant closings, automation events cause far
fewer firm separations, both at the affected firms individually and for the workforce overall.
Further, these layoffs occur more gradually, perhaps facilitating adjustment. Indeed, there is
little effect on daily wages, and cumulative earnings losses are somewhat smaller even conditional
on displacement. Overall, the displacement impact of automation seems mild in comparison to
the effects arising from changing economic conditions more generally.
11 Conclusion
Using evidence on firm-level automation expenditures across all non-financial private sectors in
the Netherlands over 2000-2016, we provide the first estimate of the impacts of automation on
individual workers. Using an event study differences-in-differences design, we find that automa-
tion at the firm increases the probability of workers separating from their employers. Incumbent
workers are around 25 percent more likely to separate from their firm, followed by a decrease in
days worked. This leads to a five-year cumulative wage income loss of about 8% of one year’s
earnings for incumbent workers. We find little change in wage rates. Further, lost wage earn-
ings are only partially offset by various benefits systems, and disproportionately borne by older
workers – the rate of early retirement increases by 24% as a result of automation.
Further, we compare the effects of automation events to what happens when firms conduct
mass layoffs or close down. A back-of-the-envelope calculation shows that far fewer workers are
32This number compares workers who leave their employers in the treatment group to workers who leave their
employers in the control group.
33This could of course in part be because the workers affected by automation spikes are different from those
affected by firm closures, in ways that allow them to better deal with job transitions. Indeed, to the extent that
workers can anticipate firm closures more than the timing of automation events, workers affected by closures may
be negatively selected.
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displaced from their firms following automation events, both at the individual firms and in the
workforce overall. Results suggest that the risk of displacement from automation is an order of
magnitude smaller than the risk of losing work due to adverse economic conditions.
It should be noted that although we have shown displacement for automating firms’ pre-
existing workforce, this of course need not imply that jobs are destroyed on net in the economy
or even at the firm as a result of automation. As a related macro literature has shown, there are
various countervailing mechanisms which our specification does not inform on, including effects
operating through firms’ input-output linkages and changes in final demand. However, our
results contribute to understanding the distributional impacts of automation across individual
workers.
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A Appendix
This supplemental appendix contains additional summary statistics and results, as well as several
robustness checks on our baseline specifications.
A.1 Additional summary statistics
Here we present some additional summary statistics.
Firstly, Figures 15 and 16 show automation cost spikes in both shares and levels for a
balanced sample of firms – that is, firms which are observed in the Production Statistics survey
every single year over 2000-2016.
Next, Table 9 provides summary statistics on our sample of workers across all years, before
matching. Next, Table 10 provides summary statistics on our matched sample of workers.
For both incumbents and recent hires, we show the averages and standard deviations for the
dependent as well as independent variables used in our models, separately for the treated and
control group. Note that we have 115, 698+1, 049, 546 = 1, 165, 244 observations for incumbents
and 94, 757+378, 433 = 473, 190 for recent hires: given our observation window of 8 years (t = −3
through t = 4) this adds up to the 1, 179, 584× 8 = 9, 321, 952 observations for incumbents and
473, 190× 8 = 3, 785, 520 for recent hires used in our regressions.
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Figure 15: Automation cost share spikes for treatment firms, balanced sample
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Figure 16: Automation cost spike level for treatment firms, balanced sample
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Table 9: Descriptives for all workers
Incumbents Recent hires
(1) (2)
Annual wage earnings 36826.28 23893.32
(25158.64) (21772.39)
Daily wage if employed 156.11 122.34
(95.18) (80.50)
Annual non-employment duration (in days) 29.10 75.82
(62.47) (95.53)
Probability of leaving the spiking firm 0.13 0.35
(0.33) (0.48)
Year-round employment status 0.96 0.88
(0.19) (0.33)
Total benefits 404.67 1606.56
(2715.01) (4411.76)
Unemployment benefits 193.24 819.11
(1859.36) (3109.38)
Disability benefits 199.52 403.96
(1943.60) (2513.62)
Welfare 11.91 383.49
(353.24) (2059.87)
Probability of entering early retirement 0.01 0.00
(0.09) (0.05)
Probability of becoming self-employed 0.03 0.04
(0.18) (0.20)
Share female 0.26 0.38
(0.44) (0.49)
Foreign born or foreign-born parents 0.16 0.29
(0.36) (0.45)
Age 42.68 36.74
(10.26) (10.15)
Calendar year 2006.91 2006.97
(3.38) (3.44)
Manufacturing 0.36 0.14
(0.48) (0.35)
Construction 0.11 0.07
(0.32) (0.25)
Wholesale and retail trade 0.19 0.16
(0.39) (0.37)
Transportation and storage 0.09 0.08
(0.29) (0.26)
Accommodation and food serving 0.02 0.03
(0.13) (0.16)
Information and communication 0.05 0.05
(0.22) (0.22)
Professional, scientific, and technical activities 0.08 0.07
(0.27) (0.26)
Admin and support activities 0.09 0.41
(0.29) (0.49)
0-9 employees 0.00 0.00
(0.06) (0.07)
10-19 employees 0.03 0.03
(0.18) (0.17)
20-49 employees 0.13 0.10
(0.34) (0.30)
50-99 employees 0.11 0.09
(0.32) (0.29)
100-199 employees 0.12 0.10
(0.33) (0.30)
200-499 employees 0.15 0.11
(0.35) (0.31)
≥500 employees 0.45 0.56
(0.50) (0.50)
Observations 9,969,232 5,453,584
Notes: Unweighted means for all worker-year observations. Standard devia-
tions in parentheses.
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Table 10: Descriptives on matched worker samples
Incumbents Recent hires
Treated Control Treated Control
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Annual wage earnings 36706.58 36708.00 21790.80 21773.95
(24227.08) (24426.67) (17998.26) (17985.85)
Daily wage if employed 149.92 149.23 108.09 105.52
(93.35) (93.34) (66.38) (66.86)
Annual non-employment duration (in days) 20.96 20.04 72.84 68.32
(42.75) (41.47) (77.47) (76.51)
Total benefits 0.00 0.00 1268.14 1215.47
(0.00) (0.00) (3471.95) (3413.38)
Unemployment benefits 0.00 0.00 705.79 647.49
(0.00) (0.00) (2461.18) (2385.00)
Disability benefits 0.00 0.00 254.10 247.61
(0.00) (0.00) (1895.58) (1848.60)
Welfare receipts 0.00 0.00 308.25 320.36
(0.00) (0.00) (1660.73) (1725.35)
Probability of entering early retirement 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Probability of becoming self-employed 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
(0.16) (0.17) (0.18) (0.17)
Share female 0.33 0.31 0.44 0.41
(0.47) (0.46) (0.50) (0.49)
Foreign born or foreign-born parents 0.18 0.18 0.34 0.37
(0.39) (0.38) (0.47) (0.48)
Age 40.93 40.98 35.98 35.68
(10.10) (9.99) (10.14) (10.11)
Calendar year 2006.35 2006.35 2007.16 2007.16
(2.42) (2.42) (1.93) (1.93)
Manufacturing 0.25 0.25 0.07 0.07
(0.43) (0.43) (0.26) (0.26)
Construction 0.08 0.08 0.03 0.03
(0.28) (0.28) (0.18) (0.18)
Wholesale and retail trade 0.25 0.25 0.12 0.12
(0.44) (0.44) (0.32) (0.32)
Transportation and storage 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.05
(0.28) (0.28) (0.22) (0.22)
Accommodation and food serving 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13)
Information and communication 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04
(0.22) (0.22) (0.20) (0.20)
Professional, scientific, and technical activities 0.10 0.10 0.06 0.06
(0.30) (0.30) (0.23) (0.23)
Admin and support activities 0.16 0.16 0.61 0.61
(0.36) (0.36) (0.49) (0.49)
0-9 employees 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.03) (0.07) (0.02) (0.06)
10-19 employees 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.02
(0.20) (0.19) (0.13) (0.15)
20-49 employees 0.15 0.14 0.08 0.07
(0.36) (0.34) (0.26) (0.26)
50-99 employees 0.12 0.12 0.07 0.07
(0.32) (0.32) (0.25) (0.26)
100-199 employees 0.12 0.13 0.08 0.09
(0.33) (0.33) (0.27) (0.29)
200-499 employees 0.15 0.15 0.07 0.10
(0.36) (0.36) (0.26) (0.30)
≥500 employees 0.41 0.42 0.69 0.64
(0.49) (0.49) (0.46) (0.48)
Observations 115,698 1,049,546 94,757 378,433
Notes: Weighted means for the full regression sample at t = −1, where weights are obtained from
coarsened exact matching as described in section 3.3. Standard deviations in parentheses.
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Figure 17: Annual real wage income in levels
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Notes: N=9,321,952 for incumbents; 3,785,520 for recent hires. Whiskers represent 95 percent
confidence intervals.
A.2 Additional results
Here we present some additional results: in particular, we show estimates on income levels, and
discuss how our findings differ by workers’ initial sector of employment and firm size.
A.2.1 Effects in levels
Figure 17 shows estimates for our main specification in levels. This shows that incumbents lost
around 3,782 euros over five years, in total, which is comparable to the 3,010 euros lost when
estimating impacts on relative income (shown in Figure 5). Recent hires lose around 466 euros
in total over the same period: note that the relative income effects for recent hires are positive
(see Figure 5), highlighting that results for recent hires are much more dependent on the exact
model specification.
A.2.2 Effect heterogeneity by residual wage quartile
We obtain an alternative measure of skill by calculating each worker’s skill level based on a
residual wage regression. That is, we regress worker wages in t = −1 onto a set of observables
and their interactions: gender, age and age squared, nationality, and sector, as well as year
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Table 11: Effect heterogeneity by residual wage quartile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Relative wage Firm separation Non-employm. Log daily Early retirem.
income probability duration wage probability
Panel A. Incumbents
Bottom quartile (ref) -1.44*** 3.99*** 3.69*** 0.07 0.20***
(0.38) (0.26) (0.42) (0.17) (0.05)
Deviations from reference group for:
Second quartile -0.02 0.77* -0.68 -0.45* 0.02
(0.47) (0.36) (0.57) (0.21) (0.07)
Third quartile 0.46 1.49*** -1.65** -0.18 -0.06
(0.47) (0.37) (0.57) (0.21) (0.07)
Top quartile -1.34** 1.83*** 0.50 -0.52* 0.13
(0.49) (0.36) (0.59) (0.23) (0.08)
Observations 9,319,736 9,319,736 9,319,736 8,999,617 9,319,736
Panel B. Recent hires
Bottom quartile (ref) 4.76*** 2.82*** -1.53 0.21 -0.02
(1.30) (0.36) (0.87) (0.42) (0.05)
Deviations from reference group for:
Second quartile -3.27* 1.07* 1.43 0.41 0.11
(1.65) (0.51) (1.22) (0.53) (0.06)
Third quartile -5.38*** 4.07*** 4.01*** -0.24 0.00
(1.61) (0.52) (1.22) (0.52) (0.06)
Top quartile -3.46* 6.46*** 2.93* -0.14 0.14
(1.61) (0.53) (1.20) (0.53) (0.08)
Observations 3,783,024 3,783,024 3,783,024 3,311,071 3,783,024
Notes: All coefficients are average annual effects over the post-treatment period (t = 0 through t = 4),
and coefficients in columns 1, 3, 4, and 5 have been multiplied by 100. Quartile 1 workers are the reference
group. Log daily wages are observed conditional on employment. *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.
fixed effects. We perform this regression separately for incumbents and recent hires, and then
construct four skill quartiles for each of these two worker groups based on the residuals of this
model. In this measure, higher quartiles correspond to higher skill levels. This measure has
the advantage that it also captures unobserved components of skill, while it of course has the
downside of potentially also capturing other factors impacting wage levels.34
Results are reported in Table 11: workers in the lowest residual wage quartile (quartile 1)
are used as the reference category throughout. Consistent with findings reported in the main
text, we conclude that “higher-skilled” incumbents are most negatively affected by automation.
34Workers’ residual skill quartile is indeed positively correlated with education levels, where this information is
available – see Table 12.
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Table 12: Distribution of education groups across residual wage quartiles
Residual wage quartile at t = −1
Education level Bottom Q2 Q3 Top Total
Low 37% 29% 22% 12% 100%
Middle 19% 26% 29% 26% 100%
High 6% 14% 28% 52% 100%
Notes: Percentage of workers of 3 education levels categorized
into 4 residual wage quartiles, at t = −1. Low education are
workers with a 4-year high-school degree or less (seq“MBO”),
middle-skilled workers are those with 5+ year high-school de-
grees and/or a vocational diploma (“HAVO, VWO, MBO2-
MBO4”), and high-educated are those with tertiary degrees.
A.2.3 Effect heterogeneity by education level
While we only observe education level for a much smaller and selected subset of workers, we
here report estimates to corroborate our findings from alternative skill measures. In particular,
education level is available as three categories – low, middle, and high, which are described in
the footnote to Table 12.
Table 12 also provides the distribution of workers of three different education levels across
residual wage quartiles. Since the availability of skill data is limited and biased towards higher-
educated workers, we ignore any differences in the shares of each of the education groups in
constructing this table. As such, if workers of different education types were evenly distributed
across the four residual wage quartiles, all numbers in this table should be 25%. Instead, we
find that 37% of low-educated workers are found in the lowest wage quartile, compared to only
19% and 6% for middle- and high-educated workers, respectively. Further, only 12% of the
low-educated are observed in the fourth, and highest, residual wage quartile, compared to 26%
and 52% of middle- and high-educated workers. This confirms that these residual wage quantiles
broadly correlate with workers’ education level, even if this need not be the only factor they
correlate with.
Table 13 shows estimates by education level. This confirms that the firm separation proba-
bility increases with workers’ skill level, for both incumbents and recent hires. However, income
losses are not statistically significantly different across education levels, suggesting higher-skilled
workers are better able to adjust to the automation shock. This is mostly because higher-skilled
incumbents and recent hires experience smaller increases in non-employment.
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Table 13: Effect heterogeneity by education level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Relative wage Firm separation Non-employm. Log daily Early retirem.
income probability duration wage probability
Panel A. Incumbents
Low education (ref) -1.98** 4.07*** 4.36*** 0.13 0.05
(0.64) (0.48) (0.83) (0.48) (0.08)
Deviations from reference group for:
Middle education 0.24 2.74*** -1.92 -1.43* 0.13
(0.76) (0.58) (0.99) (0.56) (0.09)
High education 0.48 3.54*** -2.62** -1.20* 0.04
(0.83) (0.60) (0.96) (0.53) (0.09)
Observations 2,749,439 2,749,439 2,749,439 2,662,211 2,749,439
Panel B. Recent hires
Low education (ref) -0.38 4.24*** 3.18** -2.69*** 0.03
(1.35) (0.40) (1.13) (0.55) (0.05)
Deviations from reference group for:
Middle education 2.57 1.24* -4.14** 2.17** -0.06
(1.71) (0.52) (1.40) (0.66) (0.07)
High education 3.52 3.04*** -5.16*** 2.75*** -0.03
(1.90) (0.61) (1.47) (0.69) (0.06)
Observations 1,763,766 1,763,766 1,763,766 1,584,999 1,763,766
Notes: All coefficients are average annual effects over the post-treatment period (t = 0 through t =
4), and coefficients in columns 1, 3, 4, and 5 have been multiplied by 100. Quartile 1 workers are
the reference group. Log daily wages are observed conditional on employment. *p<0.05, **p<0.01,
***p<0.001.
A.2.4 Effect heterogeneity by sector
We now consider to what extent the impacts of automation differ depending on which sector
the worker’s firm belongs to: that is, do automation events originating in different sectors have
different impacts on workers? Note that such sectoral differences may exist for various reasons.
Firstly, automation technologies may be sector-specific, and differ in terms of how much they
displace labor. For example, it is possible that industrial or warehouse robots are more labor-
replacing than automated check-out systems. Secondly, the workers employed in these different
industries may have different characteristics (such as average age), making the impacts differ by
sector. Thirdly, to the extent that skills are industry-specific, sectoral labor market conditions
matter: displacement would be costlier in sectors with an excess supply of workers. While we
cannot distinguish between these different explanations, it is still important to consider whether
our results are driven by displacement effects in a subset of sectors, or whether the found
impacts are pervasive. As shown in Table 9, the main sectors of employment for incumbents
are Manufacturing and Wholesale and retail as over 50 percent of these workers are initially
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employed there; followed by Construction, and Administrative and support activities, which
employ another 21 percent of incumbent workers. For recent hires, 41 percent is employed in
Administrative and support activities, followed by around 15 percent in Manufacturing and
Wholesale and retail trade, each.
Estimates interacting our treatment effects with workers’ sector of employment in t = −1
are shown in Table 14. For each of these models, manufacturing is the reference category. A first
important finding is that firm separation effects are found across a wide range of sectors. Indeed,
for incumbents, substantial automation-driven displacement from the firm is found for all sectors
except Accommodation and food serving – though firm separation rates (weakly) increase for
incumbents from all sectors. Among recent hires, firm separation rates also increase everywhere,
with the exception of Accommodation and food serving, where they actually decline (although
only 3 percent of recent hires are employed in this sector). Despite the effects being pervasive
across sectors, the increase in worker separations is highest among incumbents employed in
Manufacturing, Transportation and storage, and Administrative and support activities.
Increases in non-employment duration for incumbents are seen across most sectors as well
(though not for recent hires, as found on average across sectors as well), with two exceptions.
Firstly, no increase (and rather, a decrease) is seen for Accommodation and food serving, where
no increase in firm separation for incumbents occurred in the first place. Secondly, incumbents
initially employed in Administrative and support activities do not experience increases in non-
employment after the automation event despite increased firm separation rates, suggesting these
workers face more favorable labor market conditions or are otherwise more able to adjust.
Effects on wage rates, while occasionally statistically significant, are small across the board:
this implies our overall finding is not concealing substantial sectoral heterogeneity. Lastly, early
retirement effects for incumbents are largely driven by manufacturing workers.
All in all, these results show that while incumbents initially employed in manufacturing
sectors do experience some of the larger firm separation and non-employment increases, the
automation-driven displacement effects found for incumbents are pervasive across many different
sectors of the economy. Further, overall differences found between incumbents and recent hires
are not only due to their different sectoral affiliations: for example, manufacturing workers are
displaced from their firms at similar rates whether they are incumbents or recent hires, but only
incumbents experience increases in non-employment and early retirement.
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A.2.5 Effect heterogeneity by firm size
We consider how the worker effects of automation effects differ by firm size. For our purposes,
this is also important because our automation cost survey overrepresents large firms – while
these of course employ the majority of workers, it could still bias the found worker-level effect of
automation events by including too low a number of workers experiencing such events in small
firms.35
Estimates are reported in Table 15, where the largest firms (those with 500 employees or
more) are the reference category. Note that this effect only pertains the workers’ firm size in
the year before the automation event: firm size may change over time, and workers may move
to firms of different sizes. This highlights several findings.
Firstly, effects on firm separation and non-employment duration for incumbents are robust
across different firm sizes: workers in firms of all sizes experience an increase in the probability
of firm separation and days spent in non-employment four years after an automation event.
The separation effect is biggest for the largest firms but increases in non-employment and daily
wage losses are largest for the very smallest firms. All in all, this indicates that while displace-
ment occurs more frequently as a result of an automation event in the largest firms, finding
(similarly paid) re-employment is easier, also. As a result, income losses for incumbents occur
everywhere but are decreasing in firm size: and workers displaced from the very largest firms do
not experience wage losses at all.
Secondly, results for recent hires are qualitatively similar to those for incumbents: workers
at larger firms are better off. Indeed, those employed at the largest firms experience substantial
wage gains of 3.5% annually on average (and no increase in non-employment duration), whereas
those at smaller firms lose income (and increased non-employment). Since recent hires are
overrepresented among the largest firms, the average effect is dominated by the largest firms,
where losses are absent. This highlights that a firm-size effect does matter in understanding the
different outcomes of incumbents and recent hires. However, recent hires do also differ in terms
of their ability to adjust to firm separation, as discussed in the main text: workers at the largest
firms are displaced from their firms at similar rates whether they are incumbents or recent hires,
but only incumbents experience increases in non-employment and early retirement.
Lastly, increases in early retirement are predominantly observed among incumbents initially
35Note that we do not include these workers in our regression models as the control group, either, as explained
in section 3.3.
55
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3328877 
Table 14: Effect heterogeneity by sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Relative wage Firm separation Non-employm. Log daily Early retirem.
income probability duration wage probability
Panel A. Incumbents
Manufacturing (ref) -1.52*** 5.34*** 3.89*** 0.07 0.35***
(0.21) (0.20) (0.35) (0.13) (0.06)
Deviations from reference group for:
Construction -0.68 -4.03*** -0.06 -0.34 -0.10
(0.50) (0.41) (0.74) (0.24) (0.15)
Wholesale and retail trade -1.83*** -1.34*** 2.09*** -0.86*** -0.16*
(0.36) (0.30) (0.50) (0.20) (0.07)
Transportation and storage 0.96 1.70*** -1.06 0.25 -0.40**
(0.54) (0.46) (0.76) (0.29) (0.13)
Accommodation and food serv 4.07** -4.59*** -8.63*** 0.14 -0.72***
(1.33) (0.95) (1.45) (0.59) (0.14)
Information and comm -3.10*** -0.95 -0.82 -2.58*** -0.33**
(0.68) (0.57) (0.94) (0.38) (0.11)
Prof scientific techn act -0.95 -0.15 -1.22 -1.40*** 0.00
(0.50) (0.44) (0.70) (0.27) (0.09)
Admin and support act 2.72*** 2.35*** -4.40*** 0.80* -0.07
(0.66) (0.48) (0.76) (0.34) (0.08)
Observations 9,321,952 9,321,952 9,321,952 9,001,780 9,321,952
Panel B. Recent hires
Manufacturing (ref) 0.80 4.80*** 0.02 -0.08 -0.11
(0.93) (0.56) (1.02) (0.39) (0.06)
Deviations from reference group for:
Construction -5.61*** 3.54*** 5.29** -1.47* 0.39*
(1.45) (1.02) (1.71) (0.66) (0.16)
Wholesale and retail trade -1.93 2.72*** 4.27** 0.24 0.20**
(1.26) (0.72) (1.32) (0.51) (0.07)
Transportation and storage 3.37 -2.69** -1.76 -1.23 0.11
(1.96) (0.96) (1.86) (0.75) (0.12)
Accommodation and food serv 5.94 -9.40*** -5.57 2.00 -0.10
(3.67) (1.41) (2.91) (1.25) (0.15)
Information and comm -6.17*** -1.06 3.78* -1.01 0.16*
(1.80) (0.99) (1.84) (0.71) (0.08)
Prof scientific techn act -4.34** -1.35 3.60* -1.30* 0.29**
(1.59) (0.90) (1.66) (0.64) (0.09)
Admin and support act 1.79 1.23* 0.08 0.28 0.15*
(1.24) (0.61) (1.20) (0.48) (0.07)
Observations 3,785,520 3,785,520 3,785,520 3,313,317 3,785,520
Notes: All coefficients are average annual effects over the post-treatment period (t = 0 through t = 4), and
coefficients in columns 1, 3, 4, and 5 have been multiplied by 100. Workers employed in manufacturing firms at
the time of treatment are the reference group. Log daily wages are observed conditional on employment. *p<0.05,
**p<0.01, ***p<0.001.
employed in the largest and smallest firms.
All in all, the results in this section suggest we would probably find higher average wage losses
from automation for both incumbents and recent hires if our data were more representative in
terms of firm size.
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Table 15: Effect heterogeneity by firm size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Relative wage Firm separation Non-employm. Log daily Early retirem.
income probability duration wage probability
Panel A. Incumbents
≥500 employees (ref) -0.01 6.81*** 3.38*** 0.71*** 0.41***
(0.28) (0.22) (0.33) (0.14) (0.04)
Deviations from reference group for:
<10-19 employees -4.55*** -2.98*** 2.72** -3.46*** -0.06
(0.75) (0.61) (1.04) (0.42) (0.13)
20-49 employees -4.22*** -3.26*** 0.93 -2.31*** -0.18*
(0.46) (0.37) (0.59) (0.23) (0.08)
50-99 employees -2.23*** -2.88*** -1.11 -1.59*** -0.45***
(0.50) (0.41) (0.64) (0.25) (0.08)
100-199 employees -2.20*** -2.52*** -0.72 -1.80*** -0.34***
(0.49) (0.41) (0.64) (0.26) (0.08)
200-499 employees -2.14*** -3.07*** -0.70 -0.76** -0.43***
(0.45) (0.37) (0.60) (0.24) (0.08)
Observations 9,321,952 9,321,952 9,321,952 9,001,780 9,321,952
Panel B. Recent hires
≥500 employees (ref) 3.50*** 6.48*** -1.07 0.08 0.05
(0.74) (0.22) (0.57) (0.25) (0.03)
Deviations from reference group for:
<10-19 employees -11.10*** -3.85** 5.93* -2.87** -0.06
(2.31) (1.25) (2.38) (0.93) (0.09)
20-49 employees -6.46*** -1.60* 3.95** -1.15* -0.09
(1.44) (0.67) (1.33) (0.52) (0.06)
50-99 employees -5.97*** -3.69*** 7.29*** -0.65 -0.09
(1.61) (0.73) (1.44) (0.57) (0.07)
100-199 employees -8.97*** -4.88*** 8.57*** -1.38* 0.09
(1.72) (0.68) (1.44) (0.62) (0.09)
200-499 employees -3.58* -9.88*** 4.59** 1.97*** -0.05
(1.67) (0.68) (1.40) (0.59) (0.07)
Observations 3,785,520 3,785,520 3,785,520 3,313,317 3,785,520
Notes: All coefficients are average annual effects over the post-treatment period (t = 0 through t = 4),
and coefficients in columns 1, 3, 4, and 5 have been multiplied by 100. Male workers are the reference
group. Log daily wages are observed conditional on employment. *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.
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A.3 Robustness checks
In this section, we present several robustness checks on our results. In particular, one may be
concerned that our findings for automation spikes are the result of other firm-level events which
impact the firm’s workers. We consider robustness to this in three main ways.
Firstly, our data include administrative information on some of these events, such as mergers,
take-overs, acquisitions, firm splits, and restructuring. We additionally observe firm births and
deaths, but these are already excluded since we consider a balanced sample of firms over the
observation window: we do allow firm births in the first year of observation, however. We
therefore compare the estimated effects in our baseline model to those when we remove all
events (including firm births in t = −3) occurring in the entire observation window.
Beyond these observable events, there may be other firm-level changes correlating with
worker-level outcomes. Note that in our baseline specification, we do not see any pretrends at
the worker level, but the parallel trends assumption may of course still fail in the post-treatment
period if such unobserved events coincide with the automation spike. In order to deal with this
possibility, we remove firms that experience at least one very large employment change at any
time over the observation window – where we define this as an employment change exceeding
90 percent (in absolute terms). This is our second robustness check, and the idea is that such
large changes may signal other (unobserved) events.
Lastly, as a third robustness check, we additionally match workers across firms with similar
pre-treatment employment growth trajectories. This implies we now compare treated workers
with control workers not only matched on individual pre-treatment income levels, calendar year,
and sector of employment, but also ensure the treated and control workers are employed at
firms where pre-treatment employment growth is in the same quartile of the between-firm pre-
treatment employment growth distribution. Also here, the idea is to control for unmeasured
events which impact labor demand at the firm level.
Figures 18 and 19 summarize the results for all three robustness checks (along with baseline
model estimates), for incumbents and recent hires, respectively. Results for incumbent workers
are very robust: incumbents lose wage income as a result of automation, cumulating to around
10 percent of average annual earnings. For recent hires, estimates vary but are smaller than
the found effects for incumbents, and not statistically significantly different from zero in some
models.
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It is worth noting that we do still find an increased firm separation probability in all models
for both incumbents (Figure 20) and recent hires (Figure 21). This reinforces our conclusion
that while there is evidence that automation displaces both incumbent workers and recent hires,
only the former suffer income losses.
Figure 18: Wage income effects for incumbent workers: robustness checks
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Notes: Whiskers represent 95 percent confidence intervals.
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Figure 19: Wage income effects for recent hires: robustness checks
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Figure 20: Firm separation probability for incumbent workers: robustness checks
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Figure 21: Firm separation probability for recent hires: robustness checks
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